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Society Of Mind Ebook Free Download
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Mrs. Taylor's assistance in the Political Economy is confined tocertain definite points. The purely scientific part was, we are assured,not learnt from her. "But it was chiefly her influence which gave to thebook that general tone by which it is distinguished from all previousexpositions of political economy that had any pretensions to bescientific, and which has made it so useful in conciliating minds whichthose previous expositions had repelled. This tone consisted chiefly inmaking the proper distinction between the laws of the production ofwealth, which are real laws of Nature, dependent on the properties ofobjects, and the modes of its distribution, which, subject to certainconditions, depend on human will.... I had indeed partially learnt thisview of things from the thoughts awakened in me by the speculations ofSt. Simonians; but it was made a living principle, pervading andanimating the book, by my wife's promptings."[4] The part which isitalicised is noticeable. Here, as elsewhere, Mill thinks out the matterby himself; the concrete form of the thoughts is suggested or promptedby the wife. Apart from this "general tone," Mill tells us that therewas a[Pg xx] specific contribution. "The chapter which has had a greaterinfluence on opinion than all the rest, that on the Probable Future ofthe Labouring Classes, is entirely due to her. In the first draft of thebook that chapter did not exist. She pointed out the need of such achapter, and the extreme imperfection of the book without it; she wasthe cause of my writing it." From this it would appear that she gaveMill that tendency to Socialism which, while it lends a progressivespirit to his speculations on politics, at the same time does notmanifestly accord with his earlier advocacy of peasant proprietorships.Nor, again, is it, on the face of it, consistent with those doctrines ofindividual liberty which, aided by the intellectual companionship of hiswife, he propounded in a later work. The ideal of individual freedom isnot the ideal of Socialism, just as that invocation of governmental aidto which the Socialist resorts is not consistent with the theory oflaisser-faire. Yet Liberty was planned by Mill and his wife inconcert. Perhaps a slight visionariness of speculation was no less theattribute of Mrs. Mill than an absence of rigid logical principles. Bethis as it may, she undoubtedly checked the half-recognised leanings[Pg xxi] ofher husband in the direction of Coleridge and Carlyle. Whether this wasan instance of her steadying influence,[5] or whether it added one moreunassimilated element to Mill's diverse intellectual sustenance, may bewisely left an open question. We cannot, however, be wrong inattributing to her the parentage of one book of Mill, The Subjection ofWomen. It is true that Mill had before learnt that men and women oughtto be equal in legal, political, social, and domestic relations. Thiswas a point on which he had already fallen foul of his father's essay onGovernment. But Mrs. Taylor had actually written on this very point,and the warmth and fervour of Mill's denunciations of women's servitudewere unmistakably caught from his wife's view of the practicaldisabilities entailed by the feminine position.
The likings and dislikings of society, or of some powerful portion ofit, are thus the main thing which has practically determined the ruleslaid down for general observance, under the penalties[Pg 13] of law oropinion. And in general, those who have been in advance of society inthought and feeling have left this condition of things unassailed inprinciple, however they may have come into conflict with it in some ofits details. They have occupied themselves rather in inquiring whatthings society ought to like or dislike, than in questioning whether itslikings or dislikings should be a law to individuals. They preferredendeavouring to alter the feelings of mankind on the particular pointson which they were themselves heretical, rather than make common causein defence of freedom, with heretics generally. The only case in whichthe higher ground has been taken on principle and maintained withconsistency, by any but an individual here and there, is that ofreligious belief: a case instructive in many ways, and not least so asforming a most striking instance of the fallibility of what is calledthe moral sense: for the odium theologicum, in a sincere bigot, is oneof the most unequivocal cases of moral feeling. Those who first brokethe yoke of what called itself the Universal Church, were in general aslittle willing to permit difference of religious opinion as that churchitself. But when the heat of the conflict was over, without giving acomplete victory to any party, and each church or[Pg 14] sect was reduced tolimit its hopes to retaining possession of the ground it alreadyoccupied; minorities, seeing that they had no chance of becomingmajorities, were under the necessity of pleading to those whom theycould not convert, for permission to differ. It is accordingly on thisbattle-field, almost solely, that the rights of the individual againstsociety have been asserted on broad grounds of principle, and the claimof society to exercise authority over dissentients, openly controverted.The great writers to whom the world owes what religious liberty itpossesses, have mostly asserted freedom of conscience as an indefeasibleright, and denied absolutely that a human being is accountable to othersfor his religious belief. Yet so natural to mankind is intolerance inwhatever they really care about, that religious freedom has hardlyanywhere been practically realised, except where religious indifference,which dislikes to have its peace disturbed by theological quarrels, hasadded its weight to the scale. In the minds of almost all religiouspersons, even in the most tolerant countries, the duty of toleration isadmitted with tacit reserves. One person will bear with dissent inmatters of church government, but not of dogma; another can tolerateeverybody, short of[Pg 15] a Papist or a Unitarian; another, every one whobelieves in revealed religion; a few extend their charity a littlefurther, but stop at the belief in a God and in a future state. Whereverthe sentiment of the majority is still genuine and intense, it is foundto have abated little of its claim to be obeyed.
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, asentitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with theindividual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means usedbe physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercionof public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for whichmankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering withthe liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. Thatthe only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over anymember of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm toothers. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficientwarrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because itwill be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier,because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or evenright. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoningwith him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compellinghim, or visiting him with[Pg 18] any evil in case he do otherwise. To justifythat, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must becalculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of theconduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that whichconcerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, hisindependence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body andmind, the individual is sovereign.
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant toapply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We arenot speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which thelaw may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in astate to require being taken care of by others, must be protectedagainst their own actions as well as against external injury. For thesame reason, we may leave out of consideration those backward states ofsociety in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage. Theearly difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are so great, thatthere is seldom any choice of means for overcoming them; and a rulerfull of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of anyexpedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable.Despotism is a legitimate[Pg 19] mode of government in dealing withbarbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the meansjustified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, hasno application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankindhave become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion.Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbaror a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one. But as soonas mankind have attained the capacity of being guided to their ownimprovement by conviction or persuasion (a period long since reached inall nations with whom we need here concern ourselves), compulsion,either in the direct form or in that of pains and penalties fornon-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their own good,and justifiable only for the security of others. 2ff7e9595c
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